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The Paradox of Constitutional 
Amendments 
Hon. J.J. Michel Robert∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, we will celebrate the 30th anniversary of the patriation of 
the Canadian Constitution (“Patriation”). The Romans used to say, 21 
centuries ago, “Tempus fugit et ne varietur.” If you are not familiar with 
Latin, this proverb may be translated as follows: “Time passes, but 
nothing changes.” My purpose today in sharing some reflections on the 
Patriation is to illustrate how this maxim does not apply to these last 
three decades. Rather, in our case, “Time passes and everything has 
changed.”  
It is also to illustrate what I see as the paradox of constitutional 
amendments. In the case of the Constitution Act, 1982,1 it seems that 
what the drafters spent the most time on gave the least results, while 
what they spent the least time on was revealed to be the most fruitful. 
And by fruitful, I mean that Patriation has been the occasion for a 
peaceful revolution from parliamentary to constitutional primacy. To do 
so, I will focus on four main aspects:  
(1)  the amending formula, or rather formulae; 
(2)  the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;2 
(3)  First Nations’ rights; and 
(4)  natural resources. 
Before doing so, let me call to mind some events of the years 1980 to 
1982 that will situate the constitutional text in its context. 
                                                                                                             
∗  Former Chief Justice of Quebec. This paper has been translated from the original French. 
1  Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.  
2  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, id. [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIATION IN CONTEXT 
1. The 1980-1982 Amending Process  
One could say that constitutional debates occupied two entire dec-
ades, the 1960s and the 1970s. By the end of this period, Canadians were 
almost suffering from some kind of indigestion or chronic inflammation 
of this disease called constitutionitis. It seems that our focus then was not 
as directed towards the economy as it is today, because there was even 
talk at some point of the constitutional industry. And some people used 
to say that this industry was the only one that really worked!  
I had the exceptional opportunity to play an important role in the 
process of amending the constitutional text between 1980 and 1982. This 
is not necessarily a reflection of my talent, but rather of the fact that I 
happened to be at the right place at the right time. Moreover, I was not 
alone. Many great Canadians took part in this fundamental stage of the 
development of the Canadian nation.  
We must not underestimate the importance of the amendments made 
to the proposed constitutional text during this period and their impact on 
our country. Curiously enough, it seems that most of the actors involved 
have not fully grasped it.  
It must be remembered that the treatment given to the Canadian Bill 
of Rights3 by the Courts during the 1960s, and especially by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, was still preying on our minds. The failure of the 
Victoria Charter4 was also not far away in the collective memory of 
Canadians.  
2. The Dynamics of Negotiation  
Negotiations between ministers responsible for federal-provincial 
relations took place in Ottawa during the summer of 1980. Various 
committees were put in place and I had the chance to be a member of 
three of them, one of which was responsible for the Preamble. We were 
called to reflect on the notorious concept of a “distinct society”. I should 
point out that discussions among ministers were making good progress 
and that agreement on the proposed amendments had almost been 
                                                                                                             
3  S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
4  Federal-Provincial First Ministers’ Conference, Canadian Constitutional Charter, 1971 
(The Victoria Charter), Doc. 13-CD-095-E (Victoria: June 14-16, 1971). 
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reached. The version we produced is in fact contained in the text of the 
“Unilateral Resolution” ultimately adopted.  
September 1980 brought the first ministers’ constitutional confer-
ence. Both in terms of media relations and in terms of substantive 
discussions, it was a disaster. Two talented characters opposed their 
contrasting style and conflicting conceptions of Canada: Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau and Premier René Lévesque. The performances were 
impressive, but the gains were marginal, if non-existent. It was a gloomy 
day and all parties returned to their headquarters long-faced. So many 
efforts and compromises had been wasted in a few minutes of verbal 
jousting. But the Constitution is tougher than individual politicians, and 
the battle was not completely lost.  
Ultimately, the federal cabinet decided to act alone and introduced 
before the House of Commons and before the Senate the Proposed 
Resolution for a Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen respecting the 
Constitution of Canada,5 asking the United Kingdom’s Parliament to 
amend the Canadian Constitution.  
3. The References  
In the fall of 1980, the Government of Manitoba, followed by those 
of Newfoundland and of Quebec, referred various questions to their 
respective courts of appeal regarding the constitutional validity of the 
federal initiative. All three courts gave different answers: the Manitoba6 
and Quebec7 courts ruled that the federal government could act without 
the unanimous consent of the provinces, while the Court of Appeal of 
Newfoundland arrived at the opposite result.8 Appeals were brought 
before the Supreme Court of Canada and heard in May 1981 before 
judgment was rendered in September of the same year.9  
Before the Supreme Court, the Government of Canada, with the sup-
port of Ontario (represented among others by the Honourable Roy 
McMurtry) and New Brunswick, faced their adversaries, the “Gang of 
                                                                                                             
5  Tabled in the House of Commons and the Senate, October 6, 1980.  
6  Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada, [1981] M.J. No. 95, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 
1 (Man. C.A.). 
7  Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada (No. 3), 120 D.L.R. (3d) 385, [1981] 
C.A. 80 (Que. C.A.). 
8  Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada (No. 2), [1981] N.J. No. 212, 118 
D.L.R. (3d) 1 (Nfld. C.A.). 
9  Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 
S.C.R. 753 (S.C.C.). 
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Eight” led by Alberta and Quebec. Of these, history showed that one 
lacked loyalty and that another lacked subordination.  
Whereas all the provinces comprising the Gang of Eight argued that 
unanimous consent was necessary, Saskatchewan, represented among 
others by the honourable Ken M. Lysyk, proposed the “substantial 
compliance test”. In doing so, he refrained from specifying the number 
of consenting provinces necessary or raising the question whether the 
consent of the founding provinces (Quebec included) should be obtained. 
Later, in the Quebec Veto Reference, the Supreme Court answered this 
question negatively, and added that nine provinces out of 10 was suffi-
cient to respect the constitutional convention.10  
The insubordinate one was the province of Quebec, which Premier 
Lévesque claimed had been let down by the other provinces during the 
“Night of the Long Knives” of November 4, 1981.11 In the years after 
Patriation he would argue that Quebec had never signed the amendment 
to modify the Canadian constitution. Yet it should be noted that, in fact, 
there was no document to be signed. All this, as you know, led to the 
Meech Lake Accord12 and its rejection, but is in itself a topic for another 
conference.  
Mr. J.J. Robinette was chief counsel for Canada and I pleaded imme-
diately after him. Part of my argument was presented in French, includ-
ing my point about Parliament’s right to ask the United Kingdom to 
amend the constitution without the provinces’ consent. Justice Beetz, 
after having heard my position, asked me a question quite difficult to 
answer and I must admit that it threw me off balance. He had been my 
constitutional law professor at Université de Montréal from 1958 to 
1961. His point was the following: if you are right, he said, then Parlia-
ment could also ask the United Kingdom to abolish federalism. My 
immediate thought was that the government would never make such a 
demand. In fact, a more satisfactory answer was formulated by the 
Supreme Court a few years later, in the Quebec Secession Reference,13 
which identified federalism as being among this country’s fundamental 
                                                                                                             
10  Re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] S.C.J. No. 
101, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (S.C.C.).  
11  See generally Ron Graham, The Last Act: Pierre Trudeau, the Gang of Eight, and the 
Fight for Canada (Toronto: Allen Lane Canada, 2011), and Robert Sheppard & Michael Valpy, The 
National Deal: The Fight for a Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982). 
12  Federal-Provincial First Ministers’ Conference, The 1987 Constitutional Accord (Ottawa: 
June 3, 1987). The accord was originally made on April 30, 1987 at Meech Lake, Quebec.  
13  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.). 
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values, alongside democracy, respect for the rule of law and the protec-
tion of minorities.  
4. Observations on the 1981 Judgment  
One must realize that, while the federal and provincial governments 
had referred one question to the Supreme Court, we got two answers, or 
rather two judgments, for the same price; this is somewhat unusual in our 
trade. The “legal judgment” rendered was amply sustained by the 
jurisprudence and the state of the law. The Court reached the conclusion 
that the federal government has no legal obligation to obtain the consent 
of all provinces before asking the British Parliament to amend the 
constitution.14 The “conventional judgment” had a much more limited 
legal and factual basis, because as many as 23 constitutional amendments 
had already been made without the consent of the provincial govern-
ments or of their legislatures. However, the political wisdom of the 
conventional judgment was superior to that of the legal one. After 
concluding that there was no crystallized convention requiring that the 
provinces’ consent be obtained, the Court concluded however that “at 
least a substantial measure of provincial consent is required”.15 Between 
the two extreme positions of Ottawa and the provinces, and faced with 
the fact that searching for unanimity had caused constitutional immobil-
ity and sclerosis since 1927, the Court chose the middle way suggested 
by Saskatchewan. The Supreme Court’s answer was to force the parties 
to agree and, in William C. Hodge’s words, “could be declared a legal 
victory for Ottawa, but a moral victory for the provinces”.16 
III. THE PARADOX OF 1982 
In retrospect, it can be said that although the Supreme Court justices 
cannot be counted among the Fathers of Confederation, they are the 
stepfathers of a new federalism. The influence of the 1982 amendments 
on the structure and character of this country is immeasurable. For this 
reason, I consider the following three constitutional documents to be of 
                                                                                                             
14  On this point Martland and Richie JJ. dissented, making the split 7-2. 
15  Supra, note 9, at 905 S.C.R. On this point Laskin, Estey and McIntyre JJ. dissented, 
making the split 6-3. 
16  William C. Hodge, “Patriation of the Canadian Constitution: Comparative Federalism in 
a New Context” (1985) 60 Wash. L. Rev. 585.  
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the same relevance and appropriately placed in the following order of 
importance:  
• Quebec Act, 1774.17 It struck a fundamental compromise between 
two great legal traditions, the French civil law and the British com-
mon law, and by implication between our two official languages.  
• Constitution Act, 1867.18 It established the Canadian federal regime.  
• Patriation and Constitution Act, 1982.19 The 1982 amendments altered 
the foundations of this country and its very operational principle.  
Patriation was a revolution, fortunately peaceful, because it trans-
formed our regime from parliamentary to constitutional primacy. I will 
attempt to illustrate by commenting on the themes alluded to earlier: the 
amending formulae, the Charter, First Nations’ rights and natural 
resources.  
As I have noted, however, I find it paradoxical that the sections of 
the Constitution that took the greatest effort have contributed the least to 
this revolution, while those we agreed upon have been less disappointing. 
I do not know if this observation is verifiable in all negotiation contexts, 
but I hope that it can encourage greater humility and research for 
compromises in any complicated negotiation into which we engage in  
the future.  
1. The Amending Formulae 
Canadian politicians have invested an incredible amount of time and 
effort to negotiate and settle upon a single amending formula. This goes 
back to 1927 and was an uninterrupted process up until 1982. No less 
than 10 unsuccessful attempts were made. Politicians, senior officials and 
constitutional lawyers fared so well that we are now equipped with four 
amending formulae.20 What is more, the general clause distinguishes 
between various possible scenarios.  
Without amending formulae, we were able to amend our Constitution 
23 times over the last century. Regrettably, with four of them, we have 
not managed to do so once, except for the formula that only requires the 
consent of Parliament and of the Legislative Assembly of a single 
                                                                                                             
17  (U.K.), 14 Geo. III, c. 83. 
18  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
19  Supra, note 1. 
20  Sections 38, 41, 42 and 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982.  
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province.21 This perfectly illustrates the popular saying “Best is the 
enemy of better.” And I think that it is time to ask ourselves seriously if 
we have slipped ourselves in to a straitjacket.  
Will the inefficiency of the amending formulae, and particularly that 
of the general amending formula,22 also known as the “7-50” rule, remain 
with the passage of time? Obviously, 30 years is a short period in the 
course of the constitutional history of a country. But if this question 
deserves an affirmative answer and if Canadian federalism must evolve 
to face new economic and social challenges, we may have to consider 
alternatives to do so, such as judicial interpretation, delegation of powers 
or asymmetrical federalism. Because it is so arduous to attempt to predict 
the future, I will limit myself to raising the following question: how can 
we help Canadian federalism to evolve? Could the European experience 
and the principle of subsidiarity provide us with inspiration?  
2. The Charter of Rights 
In contrast to the amending formulae, the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms was in relative terms the object of little discussion. This may 
be because its civilist style discouraged common law lawyers a little at 
first. Surprisingly, the Charter rapidly took its place in our nation’s legal 
universe, with some delays in Quebec because of the political opposition 
to Patriation. This has probably to do with the fact that judicial interpre-
tation, under the auspices of the Supreme Court, was generous from the 
outset. Were we traumatized by the fate of the Canadian Bill of Rights  in 
the 1960s and afraid of living a similar experience again? Probably.  
The Charter and, most of all, its sections directing the courts to inter-
pret it, are at the centre of 1982’s peaceful revolution. We argued in front 
of the Supreme Court of Canada that the Charter had no impact on the 
division of powers, which is true. But we also pointed out that it could 
limit the powers of both levels of government. In fact, the Charter gave 
the courts a new role to play in the governance of our country. This role 
both resembles and differs from that played by the legislative and 
executive orders of government.  
Some consider that the judiciary’s new social function is anti-
democratic, but I would simply answer by pointing to the danger of a 
tyranny of the majority and to its numerous past excesses. Rather, I 
                                                                                                             
21  Section 43. 
22  Section 38.  
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believe that we are gradually evolving towards a healthy equilibrium 
between all three orders of government, based on the existence of 
constructive dialogue. The following are selected examples of the rapid 
development provoked by Patriation.  
It must be noted that “due process”, which was believed to be purely 
procedural, became substantive with the Reference on section 94(2) of 
the Motor Vehicle Act.23 Defence lawyers understood soon enough that 
“principles of fundamental justice” were nothing less than a promising 
constitutional gold mine. Advocacy and lobby groups determined to 
promote their cause also understood promptly the immense possibilities 
offered by section 15 with its non-exhaustive list of prohibited grounds 
of discrimination. They also appreciated the fundamental importance of 
section 24, which gave the courts sharp teeth allowing them to impose 
respect for rights and freedoms, and of section 52 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, enabling them to pronounce instantaneous declarations of invalid-
ity. Finally, the media understood that freedom of expression, guaranteed 
by subsection 2(b), could allow them to circumvent obstacles to their 
daily quest for truth in a world where investigative journalism serves an 
increasingly important function.  
In conclusion, there is no doubt that the generous and vigorous inter-
pretation of the Charter by the courts surprised even those most optimis-
tic regarding its adoption. Canada has profoundly changed since 1982 
and will never be the same again. The principal challenge we are now 
faced with is to decide how we will marry this commitment to the rule of 
law with the growing diversity of our society in terms of religion, 
language, culture and ethnicity. For example, Quebec’s Commission on 
Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences has revealed 
that many question the Charter’s intervention in protecting the individual 
and collective practices of Canadian immigrants from all over the 
world.24 While I believe that the balance between individual and collec-
tive interests that has been struck to this date is generally sound, only 
another decade will show whether I am right.  
                                                                                                             
23  Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).  
24  Gérard Bouchard & Charles Taylor, Consultation Commission on Accommodation Prac-
tices Related to Cultural Differences, Final Report, Building the Future — A Time for Reconciliation 
(Quebec, 2008). 
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3. First Nations’ Rights and Natural Resources  
I will address both issues jointly, because they are interrelated. The 
development of natural resources is at the heart of the development of 
this country and is inseparable from our relationships with its first 
inhabitants. New projects concerning development in the North, such as 
the Plan Nord announced by the Quebec Government in 2009,25 have 
made the question of First Nations rights all the more timely.  
The Honourable Charles Gonthier, when Justice at the Supreme 
Court and once retired, frequently noted how our law was inconsistent in 
its reference to the three cardinal values of the French Revolution: 
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. While we explicitly refer to the first two, 
for instance, in sections 2, 7 and 15 of the Charter, “Fraternity” is 
conspicuous in its absence. Patriation should also be noted for furthering 
the concept of collective rights in Canadian law, and as such the idea of 
fraternity. For instance, sections 23 and 27 guarantee minority-language 
educational rights and aim to enhance the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians. But section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 probably 
constitutes the most noteworthy advance in this direction. 
This amendment entrenched the Aboriginal and treaty rights of First 
Nations, which include the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada. 
These rights have an inherently collective dimension. For example, 
Aboriginal rights protect practices integral to a distinctive Aboriginal 
culture, and Aboriginal title guarantees the use and occupation of land 
according to the laws of the people concerned. Section 35 has thus 
invited the courts to explore the notions of fraternity, collective rights 
and what I would call “social solidarity” in a way that could have 
important implications for other areas of the law.  
This amendment was also bold because the content of the rights en-
trenched is left undefined, except for what is provided by subsections (3) 
and (4), which were added by way of the June 21, 1984 constitutional 
amendment, and by section 35.1.26 This has attracted much criticism, 
regarding the fact that their sui generis nature could be interpreted in 
restrictive ways, notably as limiting their content to what they included at 
the time of colonization.27  
                                                                                                             
25  Plan Nord, online: <http://www.plannord.gouv.qc.ca/>.  
26  These sections and subsections were included as a result of the Constitution Amendment 
Proclamation, 1983. See SI/84-102.  
27  See, for example, John Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, “The Sui Generis Nature of Abo-
riginal Rights: Does it Make a Difference?” (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9.  
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Nonetheless, the drafters decided to put their trust in the hands of the 
judiciary, not only to define the content of these rights but also to assist 
in the reconciliation of the claims, ambitions and respective interests of 
Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals. Prime Minister Trudeau had a prag-
matic explanation and is said to have remarked: “Let us trust the Courts, 
for they could not do worse than politicians.” I think that the inclusion of 
section 35 should also be seen as a mark of confidence towards us and as 
an interesting way to make progress in an area that may have been too 
politically sensitive at the time.  
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of these rights has completely 
changed the nature of the relationship between Canada, the provinces 
and First Nations. First, it solved with flexibility the obstacle posed by 
traditional evidence rules, posing for instance the principles of liberal 
interpretation of treaties and resolution of uncertainties in favour of 
Aboriginal parties,28 and of admissibility of oral history evidence in title 
claims.29 Second, it established the fundamental objective of section 35 
as being the reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies 
with the sovereignty of the Crown,30 which is meant to inform all aspects 
of the Crown-Aboriginal relationship. Third, it established a duty to 
consult and accommodate First Nations that extends to cases of risk of 
impact on potential Aboriginal or treaty rights.31  
The extent of the duty to consult and accommodate is still open to 
interpretation and refinement by the Supreme Court. Does it include a 
duty to reconcile the potentially diverging interest of First Nations and of 
economic development based on exploitation of natural resources? 
Absolutely. Reconciliation entails sharing and the process itself may well 
reveal that these interests are not as divergent as they appear at first 
glance. Many Aboriginal communities are in desperate need of employ-
ment and development. Many Canadians want their grandchildren to 
inherit a liveable environment. However, continuing to develop the 
content of these rights in a way that neither traps Aboriginal peoples in 
their own traditions nor impedes economic development initiatives will 
                                                                                                             
28  R. v. Simon, [1985] S.C.J. No. 67, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, at para. 50 (S.C.C.). 
29  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 
87 (S.C.C.). 
30  R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 31 (S.C.C.). 
31  Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.); Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 (S.C.C.).  
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)  THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 67 
demand functional pragmatism, continuous attention and openness  
of mind.  
It is worthwhile noting that the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has already recognized the rights of Aboriginal peoples to free, 
prior and informed consent to large-scale development projects that 
would have a major impact on their ancestral rights.32 Although Canada 
is still not a member of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
article 32 of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples33 expresses this same principle and we can anticipate 
that it will become part of our domestic law one day. One thing is 
certain: upcoming generations of constitutional lawyers and scholars will 
not be left without work.  
The amendments pertaining to natural resources have drawn less at-
tention. However, these are the basis for agreements between federal and 
provincial governments aimed at the development of natural resources, 
and their impact is considerable. For example, they have contributed to 
the development of less favoured provinces, such as Newfoundland and 
Labrador.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Patriation has left no one unchanged. Some may find that the text 
finally adopted lacks important elements, such as the right of provinces 
to opt out with compensation or Quebec’s right of veto regarding 
constitutional modifications. Nonetheless, all recognize that it has been 
the starting point for a revolution that has transformed our country from 
parliamentary to constitutional primacy. While it is still imperfect, we 
must cherish the peaceful and progressive way this was achieved, at least 
when compared with the violence in the Arab world that began in the 
spring of 2011 and is still ongoing. Our challenge now is to continue the 
conciliation of the individual and collective rights of peoples from all 
across the world in the mark of our values of openness, harmony and 
pacifism. 
Patriation also expresses the paradox that I have discussed: what the 
drafters spent the most time on produced the most modest results. Should 
this make us hesitant to invest energies in finding new ways in which our 
                                                                                                             
32  I/A Court H.R., Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Mer-
its, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007, Series C No. 172, at para. 134.  
33  G.A. Res. 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess. Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/61/53 (2007).  
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“living tree” will continue its growth? Certainly not. Nonetheless, it 
should make constitutional negotiators mindful of the fact that simplicity 
may prove more durable in the long term and that it may be worthwhile 
to compromise instead of refusing to accommodate until only impracti-
cable solutions are left.  
 
